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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----
;~iLt.N R. COLLIER, 
Petitioner, 
',':;:, 
FR'..D c. scm~ENDIMAN, CHIEF 
Dnver License Services, 
:1epartment of Public Safety 
fn the State of Utah, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 19379 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant's Utah driving privileges were revoked 
cr1der Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6-44.10 <1953) as amended in 1981, 
"ecause he refused to submit to a chemical test of his breath 
when requested to do so by a police officer. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A hearing before the Department of Public Safety, 
Jr1ver License Division, was held on May 9, 1983. Appellant 
petitioned the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
''
11 d for Uintah County, State of Utah, for review pursuant to 
al: Coue Ann. § 41-6-44 .10 Cb). After a trial de noyo on 
·e 16, 19831 the Seventh Judicial District Court denied 
'oedlant' s petition. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the decision of .. -111dc 
Richara C. Davidson of the Seventh Judicial District Court, 
Uintah County, State of Utah. 
The uncontroverted and undocumented facts are that on 
April 12, 1983r appellant was arrested by Officer Lynn L. 
Hooper of the vernal City Police Department for violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44, driving under the influence of 
alcohol ("DUI"). Sergeant Laursen, also of the Vernal City 
Police Department, assisted in the arrest. Appellant was 
admittedly intoxicated and was unable to perform simple field 
sobriety tests. Upon arrest, appellant was transported to the 
Vernal City Police Department where Officer Hooper requested 
that appellant submit to a breath test on an intoxilizer. 
Appellant refused. (Transcript and Appellant's Brief.) 
Officer Hooper in his police report reported that 
appellant was totally uncooperative and abusive during the 
entire episode. He used abusive language and threatened to 
cause Orficer Hooper to lose his job by talking to various 
higher authorities including Governor Matheson. Appellant told 
Officer Hooper that if Officer Hooper wrote any of this in his 
report, appellant would deny it. 
After appellant refused to submit to the breath test, 
the implied consent statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10, was 
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·:-c!ai,,ed to him. He was again asked to submit to the test. 
!.ga!f" he refused. This process was repeated a number of 
:iines. Appellant informed Officer Hooper "that he could go to 
hdl.. 
Because there is no question that appellant was 
intoxicatea and that he refused to submit to the test offered, 
the cnly possible issue before this Court on appeal is whether 
~he test offered (but refused) satisfied the requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 .10. Respondent argues that in a 
refusal fact situation, the type of test is not an issue but 
also, obviously, that the intoxilizer test meets the intent of 
the statute. 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S REFUSAL TO TAKE A BREATH TEST IS A 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 
The issue before Department of Safety Hearing Officer 
C. Niels Nielson was simply whether appellant had refused a 
ch 0 mica1 test offered to him pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44.10. The same issue was before the Seventh Judicial District 
Co 0rt. Neither the Department nor the court erred in finding 
that appellant had refused. 
Appellant argues that no "chemical test" was offered, 
'ecause an intoxilizer test for chemicals in the blood is not a 
·
110mica1 test. This argument must fail regard! ess of whether 
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or not an intoxilizer is technically a "chemical test." 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 <1953), as applicahle Jt 
the time or the arrest, provided in part: 
(a) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this 
state shall be deemed to have given his consent 
to a chemical test or tests of his breath, 
blood, or urine for the purpose of determining 
whether he was driving or in actual physical 
control ot a motor vehicle while under the 
influence or alcohol, ••• A peace officer 
shall determine which of the aforesaid tests 
shall be administered. 
No person, who has been requested pursuant to 
this section to submit to a chemical test or 
tests of his breath, blood, or urine, shall have 
the right to select the test or tests to be 
administered. The failure or inability of a 
peace orficer to arrange for any specific test 
shall not be a defense to taking a test 
requested by a peace officer nor be a defense in 
any criminal, civil or administrative proceeding 
resulting from a person's refusal to submit to 
the requested test or tests. 
(bl If such person has been placed under 
arrest and has thereafter been requested by a 
peace otficer to submit to any one or more of 
the chemical tests provided for in subsection 
(a) of this section and refuses to submit to 
such chemical test or tests, such person shall 
be warned by a peace officer requesting the test 
or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or 
tests can result in revocation of his license to 
operate a motor vehicle. • • • 
From the record it is clear that appellant was 
offered a breath test and refused. It is not clear, however, 
what test was offered. Appellant admits that a breathalyzet, 
as opposed to an intoxilizer, is a valid chemical test. 
Officer Hooper's report states at one point that an intoxilize 1 
test was offered. At another point, his report identified the 
-4-
--
tee' ,-,rfered as a breathalyzer. Although the record is not 
t~licit on this point, it is safe to assume from the testimony 
:,f this proceeding and the arguments of counsel that had 
,ppellant submitted to a test, an intoxilizer test would have 
teen given to him. This fact, however, is irrelevant to the 
oetetmination of whether a chemical test was offered to, and 
refused by, appellant. 
The inconsistency in Officer Hooper's report is most 
likely due to 1 ack of language, rather than volition. It is 
'mlikely that Officer Hooper perceived a difference between the 
, terms intoxilizer and breathalyzer. The terms are used 
s'1nonymously by most people. Indeed, this court has not made a 
distinction between the two. For example, in Holman y. Cox, 
i98 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979), in dealing with a test refusal 
issue, this court identified the test offered simply as a 
"oreath test." In Powell y. Cox, 608 P.2d 239 (Utah 1980), 
chis court identified the test offered as a "breathalyzer" 
test. .ld.. at 23 9. The language used does not matter since 
appellant's witness testified that intoxilizers had been in use 
it least as early as 1975. (R. 20) 
There is no difference between a "chemical test" and 
i test 01 the "chemicals in the blood" the purpose and 
intent of the statute. An intoxilizer is a "chemical test" 
lMenctea by the statute anyway. It is unlikely that appellant 
I.new the difference. 
-s-
There is absolutely nothing in the record to 
support the view that appellant ref used because he reasonably 
believed that no "chemical test" had been offered. Appellant 
only transcribed one witness's testimony. CR. 20) Further, 
appellant was simply offered "a breath test," and the court 
found that appellant refused to submit to any test of any 
.IU..nd. The statute clearly states that "ltlhe failure or 
inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific test 
shall not be a defense •••• • (Emphasis added.) The Utah 
implied consent statute clearly directs that a test "or tests" 
is to be given at "the direction of a peace officer" who has 
grounds to be1ieve and clearly directs that the peace officer 
shall be the one to "determine which of the aforesaid tests 
shall be aaministered.• The legislature even went further and 
added a paragraph stating that "no person who has been 
requested under this section to submit to a chemical test or 
tests of his breath, blood, or urine, shall have the right to 
select the test or tests to be administered." As well, the 
legislature added that "the failure or inability of a peace 
officer to arrange for any specific test is not a defense with 
regard to taking a test requested by a peace officer •.. " 
clearly showing a legislative intent that an individual could 
not equivocate, stall or argue by attempting to specify what 
type ot test may or may not be given. (Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44 .10 (l)) The legislature clearly showed this kind of intent 
-6-
,,
1
d as this Court has stated, the statute should be 
·.cristrued in a fashion to make its application practicable, 
and to enable an officer to deal realistically with arrested 
drivers who may be uncooperative, and even hostile." Justice 
, Stewart in Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335, 1337 Cl979). 
This legislative intent is still further exemplified 
in subparagraph (2), where the legislature again states that 
after a warning, unless the person immediately requests the 
chemical test or tests "as offered by a peace officer be 
administered, no test shall be given ••• " Utah Code Ann. 
! 41-b-44.10(21 In addition, this Court clearly held in 
Cavaness y, Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979), that the defense 
of "reasonable refusal" is not available and a simple "yes" or 
"no" answer is required. .l.d. at 352. Therefore, Judge 
Richara c. Davidson was correct in ruling that the issue before 
the court was whether or not appellant refused, and that 
appellant had, in fact, refused. Based on the Record this 
i Court can only affirm that holding. 
POINT II 
AN INTOXILIZER IS A CHEMICAL TEST WITHIN THE 
LOGICAL MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 
Appellant alleges that because no chemical reaction 
-~involved in the intoxilizer analysis, (which by definition 
nay not be true), the intoxilizer test is not a "chemical test" 
~ithin the meaning of the statute. This kind of narrow reading 
01 ~e statute is illogical and contrary to the intent and 
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purpose of the statute. Other courts that have considered Lhls 
question have uniformly rejected the argument that no chemical 
test is involved simply because no chemical reaction takes 
place. 
The earliest decision on the subject came from the 
Superior Court of Delaware in 1973. In State y. Moore, 307 
A.2d 548 (Del.Super. 1973), the court was faced with the 
question of whether an intoxilizer test gave a "chemical 
analysis" within the terms of a statute similar to the Utah 
statute in question in this case. (The Utah statutes do not 
use the language "chemical analysis".) The court stated: "The 
defendant seems to contend that the phrase 'chemical analysis' 
means an analysis made with chemicals. However, I gather that 
the phrase does not have so narrow a meaning." .l.d. at 549. 
The court found that the phrase related to an examination of 
the component parts of a chemical substance by any means and 
logically concluded, "the test in question is a 'chemical 
analysis' regardless or the fact that the procedure is purely 
mechanical." .l.d. 
In City of Dayton y. Schenck, 63 Ohio Misc. 14, 409 
N.E.2d 284 (1980), the Municipal Court of Dayton, Ohio, was 
facea with this same issue. In finding the defendant's 
definition of chemical test "far too narrow,• the court noted 
that the scientific world accepts physical tests as reliable 
-8-
,, the purpose ot chemical analysis. Therefore, the court 
nelci that "the phrase 'chemical analysis' is used quite 
cnrnrnonly to include tests for identifying chemical compounds by 
their physical properties, as the intoxilizer does.• .l.d. at 
16' 286. 
A similar result was reached by the Oregon Court of 
:,roeals in the case of State v. Dorsey, 58 Or.App. 521, 648 
! P.2d 1304 ( 1982). 
Each or these cases were decided on statutes basic-
ally similar to the Utah statutes. The "chemical analysis" 
' language is found in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44. The "chemical 
test" language is found in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10. The 
statutes in the states involved in the above cases are similar-
ly wordea. Compare, for example, the Oregon statutes involved 
in~ and in State v. Wardrip, 55 Or.App. 117, 637: P.2d 
! 2i9 (1981), with the Utah statutes. While most of the cases 
have relied on the "chemical analysis" language, there is 
a~olutely no indication that the broader language, "chemical 
test', would require a different result. Indeed, all of the 
courts seem to use the terms interchangeably. 
In another recent case of People y. Jones, 118 
'1isc.2a 687, 461 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Albany County Ct. 1983), the 
l\Jbany County Court rested its decision directly on "chemical 
test• language. The case involved the question of whether the 
-9-
Intoximeter 3000, a highly sophisticated intoxilizer device, 
was included in the statutory language, "chemical test," evp 11 
though no chemical reaction was involved. In a scholarly 
discussion, the court noted the scientific principles upon 
which the Intoximeter operates and also weighed the 
professional acceptance and use of the machine. In rejecting 
the claim that the Intoximeter did not meet the terms of the 
statute because no chemical "reaction" was involved, the court 
stated: 
The position advanced by defendant seeks to 
restrict the meaning of "chemical test" to a 
process more appropriately called a chemical 
reaction. There is no authority in the law to 
require defendant's interpretation. Further-
more, to adopt the defendant's position would be 
to bind inflexibly the administration of justice 
to the level of technology extant at the time of 
the enactment of the statute while technological 
advances thereafter would be unavailable to law 
enforcement officials if they did not fall 
within the terminology of a dated statute. If 
such a result is not required, it ought not to 
be adopted • 
.Id. at 962. The court, therefore, logically concluded that 
the term "chemical test" was "intended to mean an analysis of 
the chemistry of the substance therein referred to -- breath, 
blood, urine or saliva -- to determine the subject's blood-
alcohol content, and was not intended to refer to the method 
of testing." (Emphasis added.) 
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This Court, if it reaches this issue, certainly 
onoulCI adopt the sound reasoning of the Albany County Court. 
;:,e intoxilizer in present use by trained law enforcement 
,tticials subjects the chemicals of an air sample to a physical 
test that determines the chemical composition of the air sample 
and the blood. This information can be used to accurately 
calculate blood-alcohol levels. Therefore, although there may 
~e testimony that no chemical reaction is involved, the 
;ntoxilizer is a chemical test within the purpose and intent of 
~tah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10. 
The testimony of Dr. Kevin Mccloskey really does not 
1equire a different result. Dr. Mccloskey did not testify that 
the intoxilizer is not a "chemical test." Instead, a careful 
"ading or the testimony shows that he gave only an opinion 
that no "cnemical reaction" is involved in an intoxilizer 
analysis. In attempting to explain how an intoxilizer 
operates, Dr. Mccloskey answered as follows: 
The basic scientific principle of the 
functioning of the intoxilizer rests on a 
phenomenon called •infrared spectrometry" 
which, essentially, is taking advantage of a 
property of chemical compound, of their 
ability to absorb particular and specific 
wavelengths ot light. Essentially what the 
machine does is once a substance is in the 
chamber. it shines a specific freguency of light 
through it that is then sensed. Or any 
decrement. any reduction. in the intensity of 
that freguency of light. then. is registered on 
a sensing device and shows up electronically as 
both a presence of a compoynd. and through some 
Qther electronic apparatus the amount of that 
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compound present. But it's dependent upon the 
absorption qualities of the chemical molecules 
and no chemical reaction takes place. <Tr. 10-
11) (emphasis added>. 
This opinion clearly indicates that the test is based upon an 
analysis or the properties of a chemical compound. Further, 
Dr. Mccloskey testified during cross-examination that the 
intoxilizer is accurate and is generally accepted by the 
scientific community, (Tr. 15), which is a factor weighed by 
all of the courts. Therefore, appellant's own expert's opinion 
cannot refute respondent's position that an intoxilizer is a 
chemical test within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44.10. 
POINT III 
THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO INCLUDE INTOXILIZERS WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF THE TERM nCHEMICAL TEST OR TESTS" 
IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10. 
Appellant alleges that the legislature must have 
intended to exclude intoxilizers and other nphysical tests" 
from the implied consent statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10, 
because intoxilizers were used in 1975, and repealed and re-
enacted the statute was enacted in 1981 and no mention of 
physical tests appears in the statute. This argument must fail 
for a number of reasons. 
The argument is based on the assumption that the 
legislature was aware of the distinction appellant now assert 0 
between the breathalyzer and the intoxilizer. As has already 
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;i•Jted. this assumption is highly unlikely. The 
,t'l;s:at-ive record contains no mention of either the 
neathalyzer or intoxil izer. Since both the breathalyzer and 
:rie intoxilizer were in use prior to the 1981 enactment of the 
otatute, it is at least as likely to assume that the 
:egislature expected both would be treated similarly, as to 
issurne that the legislature intended to include one, but 
exclude the other. 
More importantly, appellant's assumption that the 
:egislature intended not to include intoxilizers because the 
scatute was enacted in 1981 and intoxilizers were in use in 
,975 (and for a number of years prior to that date) is 
1°.s~pportable because it is based on insufficient data and not 
oased on any testimony. 
Utah Cooe Ann. § 41-6-44.10 was first enacted in 
1957, many yea rs prior to the invention of the intoxil izer. 
The statute, as enacted in 1957, read in part as follows: 
(a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle in 
this state shall be deemed to have given his 
consent to a chemical test of his breath, blood, 
urine or saliva for the purpose of determining 
the alcoholic content of his blood, • • • • 
'17 Utah laws 188. It was amended in 1959, 1967, 1969, 1977, 
1S81 dnd 1983, Most of the amendments dealt with minor 
:ra.,1imatica1 or organizational corrections. Also, the words 
'Oliva and urine were deleted, and urine was subsequently 
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restored. The consequences were changed. However, the 
•cnemicai test" language has remained unchanged since 19S;. 
addition, the 1977 and 1981 versions of the statute are 
identical in every respect. In 1981, the statute was repealed 
and reenacted in exactly the same form as a part of S.B. 74 of 
1981, a comprehensive revision of the entire health code. 
Therefore, any assumptions about what the legislature intended 
by the "cnemical test" language must be based on facts known or 
available to the legislature in 1957. There is no evidence 
that the legislature ever considered the interpretation of that 
language at any subsequent date. 
Further, because all of the cases that have 
cons1dereo the question have decided an intoxilizer is a 
chemical test, it is reasonable to assume the legislature 
intendeo to include intoxilizers on each date the statute was 
amended, because the legislature did not exclude intoxilizers 
from the operation of the words chosen. 
A basic rule ot statutory construction is that the 
legislature was aware of the judicial interpretations of the 
words used, and intended the judicially established meaning. 
Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975); In....Le 
Marriage of Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371 (Cal. 1976); c. Forsrniill 
Real Estate Co. v. Hatch, 547 P.2d 1116 (Idaho 1976). It H 
therefore safe to assume the legislature did not intend to 
-14-
f>.-"ide 1ntoxilizers from the statutory term "chemical test," 
,,cE·'iil ly where no affirmative evidence of such an intent can 
._, io;rnd. 
In City of Dayton y, Schenck, 63 Ohio Misc. 14, 409 
u 2J 284 (Dayton Mun. Ct. 1980), a "chemical test" case, the 
,rt noted that dictionary meanings should not be controling. 
:~stead, "the touchstone of statutory interpretation is the 
1 'e1islat•He' s purpose, not any supposed 'plain meaning' of the 
.:rds it used." .IJ:l, at 16, 286. In rejecting a claim that an 
1 11 tnxilizer is not a chemical test, the court stated: "[Ilt is 
:.ardly conceivable that the legislature intended . • to allow 
1'to evidence the results of chemical analyses which employ 
:reo1ca1 reactions but to exclude non-reaction physical tests 
:~garded as equally reliable by persons who do chemical 
;calyses professionally every day." .IJ:l. at 16, 286, 
statutory citation omitted). In the instant case, appellant's 
:'.aim that the legislature intended to exclude intoxilizers 
' :ro~ the meaning or the term "chemical test" is equally as 
;.1•.:oncei vabl e. 
POINT IV 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
IN DETERMINING THAT THE INTOXILIZER IS A "CHEMICAL TEST." 
Appellant argues the lower court committed error by 
'''1ny iudicial notice that the intoxilizer is a chemical test. 
,,i,IJ~ it was argued at trial that it would be proper for the 
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court to take judicial notice that the intoxilizer is a 
chemical test within the meaning of the statute, there is ~ 0 
evidence in the record that the district court took judicial 
notice of this fact. In fact, the court below did not even 
decide the issue ot whether an intoxilizer is a chemical test, 
but chose to rest its decision on the broad language of the 
statute which says "the failure or inability of a peace officer 
to arrange for any specific test shall not be a defense to 
taking a test requested by a peace officer nor be a defense in 
any criminal, civil or administrative proceeding resulting from 
a p~rson's refusal to submit to the requested test or tests." 
Utah Code Ann. S 41-b-44.lO(a). <..s..e..e., Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order, Findings of Fact #3.) 
; Appellant's argument that a court cannot judicially determine a 
question of statutory construction is fallacious. That is 
emphatically the province of the court. Appellant has confused 
the doctrine of judicial notice. 
While a court may only take judicial notice of 
certain types of facts, the court must judicially decide 
questions of law and of statutory construction. The court 
would have been well within its bounds if it had decided an 
intoxilizer is a chemical test within the meaning of Utah Cod• 
Ann. S 41-6-44.10, but apparently did not. 
Assuming the court below had taken judicial notice 
that an intoxilizer is a chemical test under the old Rule 9 of 
-16-
:c L'i.ah Rules of Evidence, as appellant asserts, the court 
'·"ilc hi\ve done so properly. Rule 9 (now Rule 201) allows a 
c:,urt to take judicial notice of facts of generalized (not 
;enerall knowledge "which are capable of immediate and accurate 
jetermination by resort to easily accessible sources of 
iridisputable accuracy." As has already been noted, the 
s:ientific world generally accepts the principles of infrared 
1,olecular absorption and spectrophotometry as accurate and 
reliable means of identifying the chemical composition of 
dnown compounds. Such inf or ma ti on can be obtained from any 
textbook on the subject. 
The words used by the statute are "chemical test," 
not "chemical reaction." Therefore, the court would have been 
•ithin its bounds if it had decided to take judicial notice of 
lhe intoxilizer as a "chemical test," or a chemical test of the 
chemica1s and compounds in the blood within the purpose and 
intent of the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
An intoxilizer test is a "chemical test" within the 
~eaning or Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 .1 O. Appellant was offered 
'brertth test and refused. Under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10, 
rt was the duty of the Department of Public Safety, Driver 
'
1cense D1vis1on, to revoke appellant's license for one year. 
The Seventh Judicial District Court, Uintah County, 
State of Utah, correctly held that the only issue before it was 
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whether or not appellant had refused an offered test. Tha• 
court correctly held that appellant had refused and that hi· 
license should be revoked. Respondent respectfully request•, 
that this court affirm the holding of the district court. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of Januaty, 
1984. ~~ h7_ 7;/ _/' 
·~· 
BRUCE M. HALE 
Assistant Attorney General 
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